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ABSTRACT 
 
Placeshifting is a convenient service that enables 
customers to enjoy television programs from their home 
countries even if they are in foreign countries. 
Placeshifting works by receiving/recording a television 
program in one country and then transmitting the digital 
data to customers everywhere in the world via the Internet 
upon each customer’s request. Because placeshifting may 
be involved with recording and/or transmitting copyrighted 
content, service providers must face the question whether 
they may be liable for copyright infringement. In the United 
States, the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings decided the legality of placeshifting by requiring 
a “volition element” for direct infringement. In Japan, 
however, court decisions have varied. Most of the courts 
have applied an overall consideration standard such as the 
“Karaoke rule.” As a result, there remains large 
uncertainty about the state of the law in Japan. This Article 
introduces the legal basis and judicial decisions for 
                                                                                                         
∗ Naoya Isoda is a 2010 graduate of the Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy Graduate Program at the University of Washington School of Law. He 
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placeshifting both in the United States and Japan and 
suggests introducing the volition requirement as one 
possible solution for the uncertainty in Japan.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
If you go abroad for business or to study for a long period, 
wouldn’t it be convenient to be able to watch your favorite 
television programs from home? Recently, a so-called 
“placeshifting”1
The U.S. copyright statute does not answer this question 
directly because such a service did not exist at the time the 
legislation was drafted, and there has been no case law directly 
addressing this issue. In the digitalization and networking era, as 
the Supreme Court indicated in MGM Studios v. Grokster,
 service has come to fulfill such a demand. With 
placeshifting, customers can watch television programs, including 
copyrighted ones, through a device installed by the service 
provider, who then must face the question whether the service 
provider may be liable for copyright infringement. 
2 it is 
essential to consider not only “copyright protection” but also 
“promoting innovation in new communication technologies.”3
                                                                                                         
1 See Digital Content and Enabling Technology: Satisfying the 21st Century 
Consumer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) 
(statement of Mr. Jason Krikorian, one of the founders of Sling Media Inc., 
about the term “placeshifting.”). At a hearing of Congress, Mr. Krikorian 
introduced his product, SlingBox, by saying: 
 In 
[W]hat we believe is this notion of placeshifting is the next 
major evolution in television viewing. And what does it do? It 
greatly increases the number of displays, that I can watch my 
familiar television, which is the key word here, but also 
greatly increases the number of places that I can watch my 
familiar television as well. . . . So quite simply, the Slingbox, 
which is this small box that you can buy now at Best Buy, 
CompUSA, over 3,000 stores nationwide, is $200, $249 retail. 
Basically take your television signal, put this in your home, 
take your basic cable, take your TiVo, take your satellite box, 
really over 5,000 different devices, plug your TV signal in, 
connect it to your home network, and then wherever you 
happen to be, you can watch and control your living room TV 
just like you were sitting on the couch. 
Id. at 16. 
2 MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
3 Id. at 928. Also in the Japanese Copyright Act, its purpose is not limited 
only to the protection of an author’s benefit. Namely, the Japanese Copyright 
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deciding the legality of the placeshifting service, therefore, courts 
must balance these factors. 4
In Japan, conclusions on this issue have varied among court 
decisions. Thus, there is uncertainty for any company that plans to 
introduce a placeshifting service to predict whether its business 
will be legal. In the United States, however, the Second Circuit 
rendered a decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings
 Without a proper balance, any 
company that wants to introduce new technology services may be 
too cautious to start its business. 
5  
(Cablevision) that lends some guidance. The most remarkable 
point in this decision is that the court required a “volition” 6  
element for the existence of direct infringement. The court held 
that the placeshifting provider was not liable for direct 
infringement on the ground that any “volitional” conduct 
associated with copying the copyrighted content at issue was not 
made by the provider but by individual customers instead.7
Chapter I provides a general overview of placeshifting 
services, both in the U.S. and in Japan. Chapter II introduces, as 
 This 
Article analyzes the current legal problems for placeshifting, both 
in the United States and Japan. 
                                                                                                         
Act defines its purposes as not only “to secure the protection of the rights of 
authors, etc.,” but also to obtain “a just and fair exploitation of. . . cultural 
products,” and consequently “to contribute to the development of culture.” 
Chosakuken Hō [Japanese Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 1, 
translated in CHOSAKUKEN KANKEI HŌREI DĒTA BĒSU [COPYRIGHT-RELATED 
LAW DATABASE] (Copyright Research and Information Center (CRIC)), 
available at http://www.cric.or.jp/cric_e/clj/clj.html. 
4 See Dominic H. Rivers, Note, Paying for Cable in Boston, Watching It on 
a Laptop in L.A.: Does Slingbox Violate Federal Copyright Laws?, 41 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 159, 192 (2007). 
5 Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (hereinafter Cablevision). 
6  Generally, the term “volition” means “the power to choose something 
freely or to make your own decision.” OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S 
DICTIONARY of CURRENT ENGLISH 1391 (7th ed. 2005). The substantial 
meaning of the term “volition” as used in Cablevision will be introduced later.  
7  See Chad Woodford & Mitchell Zimmerman, Second Circuit Paints 
Digital Cloudscape Favoring Technology Firms’ Use of Copyrighted Content, 
25.12 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 5, 5 (2008); see also Cablevision, 536 F.3d 
at 130-133. 
4
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss2/7
2011]    LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS GROUP FEATURE ARTICLE 153 
the basis of comparative law, the basic structures of the U.S. and 
Japanese copyright laws regarding the liability of an indirect actor. 
Chapter III discusses the volition requirement in Cablevision. 
Chapter IV discusses Japanese case law regarding placeshifting 
services and shows the problems caused by uncertainty. Chapter V 
analyzes how Japanese law should treat the legality of 
placeshifting.  
 
I. WHAT IS “PLACESHIFTING”? 
 
A.  Characteristics of Placeshifting Service 
 
Placeshifting is a service whereby: (1) a device set by the 
provider receives and records8 television programs broadcast in 
one country and (2) transmits the programs to its customers via the 
Internet, so that (3) its customers can then view the programs 
anywhere in the world. It must also be recognized that most of the 
services use a device that is individually allocated to each customer 
at the provider’s central place of business and is manipulated via 
remote control by each customer, not by the service provider. It is 
not a mere rebroadcasting of the TV broadcast,9
Sling Media Inc., one such placeshifting provider, defines the 
term “placeshifting” as: 
 but is similar to 
the use of a DVD recorder or a video cassette recorder (VCR). 
[A] service that “allows anyone with a broadband 
Internet connection to have video streams from their 
home television set, DVR or other video source 
(such as a DVD player or home security camera) 
                                                                                                         
8 Some placeshifting services do not have a function for recording television 
programs by its central device, but merely transmit it to the customer such as 
Maneki TV in Japan. 
9 In Japan, rebroadcasting constitutes infringement of the neighboring right 
of broadcasting organizations. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 99(1). 
Also, rebroadcasting might be infringement of copyright (right of public 
transmission). Id. at art. 23(1). Similarly, rebroadcasting might constitute 
infringement of the public performance right in the U.S. 17 U.S.C. §106(4), 
§101(“To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . (2) to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public . . . “). 
5
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forwarded for viewing remotely on a computer, 
netbook, or mobile phone at any location where 
they have a high-speed Internet connection or 
cellular data network.10
Accordingly, placeshifting can best be understood in 
relationship to its predecessor, “timeshifting.” Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios
  
11  centered on whether the 
defendant, Sony, was liable for contributory infringement by 
making and selling Betamax video tape recorders. The Supreme 
Court emphasized that the “timeshifting” function of Betamax was 
a permissible “substantial noninfringing use. 12
[T]he practice of recording a program to view it 
once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-
shifting enables viewers to see programs they 
otherwise would miss because they are not at home, 
are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a 
program on another station at the time of a 
broadcast that they desire to watch.
 The Court 
explained timeshifting as follows: 
13
However, it can be said that placeshifting is well beyond such a 
timeshifting function
  
14
Although placeshifting is a successor to timeshifting, it is not a 
completely novel technology. Placeshifting combines some 
preexisting technologies such as digital recording technology and 
networking technology.
 because the user can view the program 
anywhere in the world as long as she is connected through the 
Internet. Namely, the user may select the place to view TV 
programs. That is why it is known as “placeshifting.” 
15
                                                                                                         
10  Sling Media, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/placeshifting (last visited 
May 26, 2011).  
 The innovative point in placeshifting is 
11 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
12 Id. at 442. 
13 Id. at 423. 
14  See Sling Media, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/placeshifting (last 
visited May 26, 2011). 
15 See Rivers, supra note 4, at 159. In this regard, the Second Circuit in 
Cablevision explained that the device at issue, the Remote Storage Digital Video 
Recorder System, “use[s] a technology akin to both traditional, set-top digital 
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its combination of these pre-existing technologies with new 
services designed to match consumers’ demands. 
 
B.  Placeshifting Service Providers in the U.S. And Japan  
 
In the United States, placeshifting service providers include 
Cablevision (Service: “RS-DVR”), 16  Sling Media (Product: 
“Slingbox”),17 SageTV, LLC (Product: “SageTV Placeshifter”),18 
Orb Networks (Service: “MyCasting”), 19  and Sony (Product: 
“LocationFree”). 20  Similarly, in Japan there have been several 
placeshifting services such as “Maneki TV” by Nagano Syōten 
K.K.,21 “Rokuraku II” by Nihon Digital Kaden K.K.,22 “Rokuga 
Net” by FA Vision K.K.23 and “Yoridorimidori” by Kuromusaizu 
K.K.24 Any one of these companies risks being sued by content 
owners in the future due to the unpredictability of copyright 
liability.25
 
 
C.  Differentiation from the Term “Space-Shifting” 
 
In Japan, some Japanese articles use the term “space-shifting” 
broadly, instead of “placeshifting,” to include transmitting services 
                                                                                                         
video recorders, like TiVo (“DVRs”), and the video-on-demand (“VOD”) 
services.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123. 
16 Optimum, http://optimum.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1762/ 
related/1 (last visited May 26, 2011). 
17 Slingbox® SOLO, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/solo and Slingbox® 
PRO-HD, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/prohd (last visited May 26, 2011). 
18 Sage TV, http://sagetv.com/placeshifter.html (last visited May 26, 2011). 
19 Orb, http://www.orb.com/en (last visited May 26, 2011). 
20 Sony, LocationFree Bast Station, http://www.sonystyle.com (last visited 
May 26, 2011). 
21 Manekitv, http://www.manekitv.com (last visited May 26, 2011). 
22 Rokuraku, http://www.rokuraku.com (last visited May 26, 2011). 
23  http://www.6ga.net (last visited May 26, 2011). However, FA Vision 
stopped Rokuga Net in 2006 in accordance with the settlement with copyright 
holders after the Intellectual Property High Court’s decision that the service 
constitutes copyright infringement on November 15, 2005. 
24 Author unable to locate Yoridorimidori website after the Osaka High 
Court granted injunction against it on June 14, 2007. 
25 See Rivers, supra note 4, at 179. 
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for television programs such as Maneki TV or Rokuraku II.26 In 
the United States, providers of Internet-related services, such as 
file-sharing services, originally used the term “space-shifting” to 
emphasize their service’s legality as “fair use” by drawing a 
comparison to “time-shifting,” 27  which was held to be legal in 
Sony. 28  These service providers argued under the term “space-
shifting” that, “[A] person who owns a copyrighted compact disc 
who then copies the content to a digital file does not engage in 
infringement. Instead, that person is merely shifting material that 
she already owns from one ‘space’ to another.”29 However, such a 
fair use defense was later denied by the courts.30 Accordingly, this 
Article distinguishes the term “placeshifting” from the term 
“space-shifting” and uses the former for the services at issues in 
the Cablevision 31
  
 case in the United States and some cases in 
Japan. 
                                                                                                         
26  See, e.g., Hisao Shiomi, Chosakuken Shingai no Sekinin Syutai – 
Fuhoukouihou oyobi Shiteki Fukusei/ Koushū Sōshin Ken no Shiten kara – 
[Responsible Principal of Copyright Infringement – From Perspective of Tort 
Law and Private Reproduction and Right of Public Transmission], in SAITŌ 
HIROSHI SENSEI GOTAISYOKU KINEN RONSHŪ - GENDAI SYAKAI TO CHOSAKUKEN HŌ [THE 
PRESENT SOCIETY AND COPYRIGHT LAW - ANNIVERSARY COLLECTION OF ARTICLES FOR 
RETIREMENT OF PROFESSOR HIROSHI SAITŌ] 197, 214-215 (Toyohiro Nomura & 
Toshiaki Makino ed., 2008). 
27 See Rivers, supra note 4, at 175-76; see also A&M Records v. Napster, 
239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (using the term “space-shifting”), UMG 
Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (using the 
term “space shift” in the context of fair use defense). 
28 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that 
“home time-shifting is fair use.”). 
29 Rivers, supra note 4, at 175-76 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. at 176; see also Napster. 239 F.3d at 1019; MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
at 351. 
31 Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
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II. U.S. AND JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW REGARDING  
INDIRECT LIABILITY 
 
A.   U.S. Copyright Law 
 
There are two legal theories to hold liable a service provider 
who causes exploitation of copyrighted works by its customers: 
direct infringement and secondary liability. 
 
1. Direct infringement in the digital and networking era 
 
Direct infringement can be established by showing that a 
defendant directly infringes exclusive rights listed in Section 106 
of the Copyright Act, such as the reproduction right32 or the public 
performance right.33
Further, courts might have difficulty trying to decide who 
actually exploits a particular copyrighted work, and thus who 
directly infringes a particular exclusive right—the service provider 
or its end users. Professor Ginsburg has indicated: 
 Because current services in the digital and 
networking era did not exist at the time the Copyright Act of 1976 
was drafted, it is difficult to determine the scope of the exclusive 
rights applied to such services.  
[T]he exclusive rights are capacious, but new 
technologies may have caused some of the general 
phrases to become more constraining than might 
have been expected from a text whose drafters took 
pains to make forward looking. . . . Entrepreneurs 
and users of new technological means of exploiting 
copyrighted works have urged narrow constructions 
of each of these terms, arguing that broad 
interpretations will chill future innovation (and 
suppress present markets for copyright-exploiting 
                                                                                                         
32 17 U.S.C. §106(1) (identifying “the exclusive right[] . . . to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”).  
33 17 U.S.C. §106(4) (identifying “the exclusive right[] . . . in the case of 
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly”).  
9
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devices or services). Copyright owners, concerned 
that unfettered new uses will supplant traditional 
copyright-controlled markets, have contended that 
the literal language, or, failing that, congressional 
intent, encompass the contested use. In addition, 
new technologies have called into question the 
identification of the person who “does” the 
copyright-implicating acts.34
The legality of placeshifting is directly related to this question.  
  
 
a. Netcom decision 
 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communications Services is one example of a direct infringement 
case in the digital and networking era. 35  In Netcom, the court 
addressed whether an Internet service provider (ISP) is liable for 
direct infringement by automatically copying user-posted content 
in the random access memory (RAM) of its central computer.36
The District Court for the Northern District of California 
concluded that Netcom was not liable for direct infringement,
 An 
Internet user could post a copyrighted work without any consent of 
its copyright holder on a certain bulletin board system (BBS) 
through Netcom facilities. During that process, the posted content 
was automatically copied in the RAM of Netcom’s central 
computer. The plaintiff, a copyright content owner, sued Netcom, 
in addition to the Internet user and the BBS operator, for direct 
infringement of the reproduction right and for secondary liability. 
37
                                                                                                         
34 Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II, 
Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, in Columbia Public Law & Legal 
Theory Working Papers, Paper 08158, 1(2008), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/08158 (emphasis added). 
 
reasoning that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute, 
there should still be some element of volition or causation which is 
lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy 
35 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
36 See id. at 1367-73. 
37 Id. at 1372-73. 
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by a third party.”38
Under this requirement, a service provider should not be liable 
for direct infringement unless it engages in some volitional 
conduct in relationship to the copying of a particular copyrighted 
work. For example, if a BBS operator censors a specific posted 
content and then later decides to display it on the bulletin board, 
the volition requirement might be satisfied. However, Netcom—an 
ISP—neither censored any posted content nor decided whether a 
specific content may be displayed or not. Consequently, the court 
was not persuaded that Netcom committed such volitional conduct 
concerning the plaintiff’s specific copyrighted work at issue posted 
by the Internet user.
 In other words, Netcom required a volition 
element for direct infringement.  
39
The volition standard in Netcom has been adopted by 
subsequent courts.
 
40  Netcom also influenced the safe harbor 
provisions in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act, an integral component of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA). By including the language “automatic 
technical process”41
                                                                                                         
38 Id. at 1370. 
 in the statute, Congress essentially codified 
Netcom as a safe harbor for “transitory digital network 
39 See id. at 1372. 
40 See, e.g., CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, 550-55 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(ISP case denying direct infringement); Arista Records v. USENET.com, 633 F. 
Supp. 2d 124, 147-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (BBS operator case denying direct 
infringement); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006), 
aff’d mem., 242 Fed. Appx. 833 (3rd Cir. 2007) (holding cashing websites by 
Googlebot not direct infringement); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 
(D. Nev. 2006) (holding cashing websites by Googlebot not direct 
infringement); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (BBS operator case denying direct infringement). But see Playboy Enters. 
v. Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (denying the 
application of the volition requirement by distinguishing the present case 
concerning the contents website operator from the ISP case in Netcom). 
41  17 U.S.C. §512(a)(2) (“[T]he transmission, routing, provision of 
connections, or storage is carried out through an automatic technical process 
without selection of the material by the service provider.”) (emphasis added); 17 
U.S.C. §512(b)(1)(C) (“[T]he storage is carried out through an automatic 
technical process for the purpose of making the material available to users of the 
system or network who . . . request access to the material from the person . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
11
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communications” (17 U.C.C. §512(a)) and “system caching” (17 
U.C.C. §512(b)).42
 
 
2. Secondary Liability 
 
Although the U.S. Copyright Act does not have any statutory 
provision for secondary liability, there are three categories of well-
established secondary liability under case law: vicarious, 43  
contributory, 44  and inducement liability. 45
                                                                                                         
42 See 3-12B Nimmer on Copyright §12B.06 [B][2][a]-[b] (2010). Professor 
Nimmer said, “to apply the law as it is actually written, courts at present must 
advert to the Netcom factor of there being ‘some element of volition’ when it 
comes to the safe harbors for transmitting [note: §512(a)] and caching [note: 
§512(b)].” Id. at §12B.06 [B][2][a]. Professor Nimmer also indicated, after 
codifying the volition requirement in the safe harbor provisions, “Netcom’s 
requirement for ‘some element of volition’ should not be viewed as a free-
standing feature of copyright law. Rather, it should be followed to the extent that 
Congress deliberately embodied it into the law, and not followed in the other 
instances for which Congress chose not to codify it.” Id. at §12B.06 [B][2][b]. 
 Before analyzing 
In contrast, some lower courts have actually required the Netcom’s volition 
element even after birth of the safe harbor provisions. Thus, it can be said that 
there is still uncertainty on this issue regarding the relationship between the 
volition requirement in Netcom and the safe harbor provisions. Just as with the 
Cablevision case, placeshifting providers lost the occasion that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would discuss this issue because it denied granting a writ of 
certiorari. See infra Chapter III.D of this Article. Addressing such U.S. Supreme 
court’s denial, Professor Nimmer finally said, “[t]he last word therefore has yet 
to be pronounced here.” Id. at §12B.06 [B][2][b]. 
43 Vicarious liability exists if the following two requirements are satisfied: 
(1) “the defendant must possess the right and ability to supervise the infringing 
conduct” and (2) “the defendant must have an obvious and direct financial 
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.” Nimmer, supra note 42, 
§12.04 [A][2] (citation omitted). See Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
44  “[I]f there is knowledge that the work in question constitutes an 
infringement, then one who causes another to infringe will himself be liable as 
an infringer.” Nimmer, supra note 42, §12.04 at [A][3][a]. See Gershwin Publ’g 
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
45 The Supreme Court in Grokster clarified the inducement rule, holding 
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. 
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placeshifting, it is important to note two important issues related to 
secondary liability: the staple article doctrine and the role of direct 
infringement.  
 
a. Sony’s staple-article rule for contributory liability  
 
The Supreme Court in Sony ruled that copying equipment 
should not constitute contributory infringement if it is capable of 
“substantial noninfringing uses,” referring to the “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine regulated in Section 271(c) 46
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike 
a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate 
demand for effective -- not merely symbolic -- 
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights 
of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated 
areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of 
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it  
 of the U.S. 
Patent Act: 
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.47
                                                                                                         
46 Section 271(c) provides the contributory liability for patent infringement: 
  
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or 
imports into the United States a component of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a 
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, 
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same 
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
35 U.S.C. §271(c) (emphasis added). 
It expressly provides an exception for contributory liability that the sale of a 
“staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use” is not contributory infringement. Thus, this exception is called the “staple 
article of commerce doctrine.” See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
47 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. This rule was applied to the ISP case. See, e.g., 
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b.  Necessity of direct infringement for secondary liability 
 
In order to establish a secondary liability claim, there must be 
direct infringement as a basis of the secondary liability. In this 
regard, Professor Nimmer suggests:   
[I]t is more in keeping with traditional notions of 
third party liability to confine the inquiry into 
whether there can be culpable participation in an 
infringement to those instances when such 
infringement has in fact occurred. The Supreme 
Court [in Grokster] has recognized the validity of 
this proposition in its explication of one branch of 
third party liability, commenting that “the 
inducement theory of course requires evidence of 
actual infringement by recipients of the device.”. . . 
[T]he rule should generally prevail that third party 
liability, as its name implies, may exist only when 
direct liability, i.e., infringement, is present.48
Thus, in a case of placeshifting, a service provider should not 
be secondarily liable for its customer’s exploitation of a particular 
copyrighted work, provided that the customer is not liable for 
direct infringement, perhaps because the customer can establish a 
valid defense such as fair use.
 
49
 
 
3. Fair use exception 
 
Even if someone exploits a copyrighted work without consent 
by the copyright holder, he or she is not liable for copyright 
infringement provided such exploitation constitutes “fair use.”50
                                                                                                         
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-75. Also, this rule was applied to the file-sharing 
service cases. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 In 
48 Nimmer, supra note 42, §12.04 at [D][1] (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 
940). 
49 See Woodford, supra note 7, at 10; see also Michael Bartley, Slinging 
Television: A New Battleground For Technology And Content Holders?, 48 
IDEA 535, 558-59 (2008). 
50 17 U.S.C. §107. 
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determining whether exploitation of copyrighted work is “fair 
use,” Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act stipulates that the 
following factors should be considered:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.51
In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the home timeshifting use 
by an individual user of Betamax constituted fair use
 
52 and that the 
Betamax was capable of “substantial noninfringing uses.”53
 
 
B.  Japanese Copyright Law 
 
Similar to the United States, an indirect actor who does not 
directly exploit a particular copyrighted work, but is indirectly 
involved with it, may be liable for copyright infringement in Japan. 
However, in contrast with the United States, Japanese copyright 
law does not have an independent rule for “secondary liability.”54
                                                                                                         
51 Id. 
 
52 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55. 
53 See id. at 455. 
54  Japanese scholars discuss the indirect actor’s liability under an issue 
named “Kansetsu Shingai” [indirect infringement] in comparison with the 
general infringement issue. See, e.g., Yoshiyuki Tamura, Chosakuken no 
Kansetsu Shingai [Indicrect Infringement of Copyright], 26 Chitekizaisan 
Houseisakugaku Kenkyu 35 (2010), Hirotaka Fujiwara et al., Chosakuken no 
Kansetsu Shingai no Hōri to Sono Genkai [The Rule of Indirect Infringement of 
Copyright and its Limitation], in Chosakukenhō no Shin Ronten [New Issues of 
Japanese Copyright Act] 393 (2008).  
However, the term “Kansetsu Shingai” [indirect infringement] itself legally 
have no meaning. Thus, in Japan, the literal differentiation between the terms 
“direct infringement” and “indirect infringement” never provides any substantial 
legal rule. 
15
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Instead, Japanese court interprets liability through the lens of direct 
infringement.  
 
1. Copyright Holder’s Claims of Damage and Injunction Relief  
 
 In a copyright infringement case, a copyright holder may 
seek both damages and injunctive relief. A damages claim is based 
on tort law.55
Article 719 [(1) If more than one person has 
inflicted damages on others by their joint tortious 
acts, each of them shall be jointly and severally 
liable to compensate for those damages. . . .] (2) 
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall 
apply to any person who incited or was an 
accessory to the perpetrator, by deeming him/her to 
be one of the joint tort-feasors.
 There is a general tort rule, Article 719(2) of the 
Japanese Civil Code, that provides an indirect actor’s liability: 
56
This provision has been applied to damages claims in copyright 
infringement cases, but not to claims seeking injunctive relief. 
Under tort law, a copyright holder can therefore benefit only from 
monetary compensation,
 
57 not injunctive relief.58
In contrast, in intellectual property infringement cases, 
Japanese court may grant injunctive relief when explicit statutory 
authorization allows it.
  
59
                                                                                                         
55 MINPŌ [JAPANESE CIVIL CODE], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709, translated 
in NIHON HŌREI GAIKOKUGOYAKU DĒTA BĒSU [JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION 
DATABASE] (Ministry of Justice, Japan) available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1928&vm=04&re=01&
new=1 (emphasis added). 
 Explicit legislative authorization for 
56 Id. art. 719 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. art. 721 (1), 417, 723. 
58  See Tamura, supra note 54, at 35-36, RYŪ TAKABAYASHI, HYŌJUN 
TOKKYO HŌ [PATENT LAW FROM THE GROUND UP], 3-4 (3d ed. 2008). 
59 See, e.g., Tokkyo Hō [Japanese Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 
100, Syōhyō Hō [Japanese Trademark Act], Law No. 127 of 1959, art. 36, Isyō 
Hō [Japanese Design Act], Law No. 125 of 1959, art. 37. Unlike U.S. courts that 
authorize injunction as an equitable remedy, Japanese law in civil law country 
does not recognize equity. 
The reason why courts need statutory authorization is because the origin of 
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copyright infringement, Article 112 of the Copyright Act provides:  
Article 112. (1) Against those who infringe or are 
likely to infringe the moral rights of authors, 
copyright, right of publication, moral rights of 
performers or neighboring rights, the author, the 
performer or the owner of a copyright, right of 
publication or neighboring rights may make a 
demand for cessation or prevention of such 
infringements.60
According to the plain language of Article 112 (1), a copyright 
holder who wants injunctive relief must prove that a defendant 
falls within the scope of the principal committing infringement.  
 
Because injunctive relief is an important tool for copyright 
holders to stop infringing conduct, it is quite common in Japan that 
a plaintiff will seek injunctive relief in a copyright infringement 
lawsuit. As a result, in the case that an indirect actor’s liability is 
contended, it is common to discuss whether the indirect actor falls 
within the scope of the principal committing the infringement in 
                                                                                                         
injunctive relief in intellectual property law (such as Japanese Patent Act, 
Japanese Copyright Act) is derived from “Haitateki Shihai Ken” [exclusive 
possession] inhered in “Yūtai Butsu” [tangible thing], a terminology of “Bukken 
Hō” [real right law].  
Professor Ryū Takabayashi indicated, under Japanese law:  
[A]n object covered by Haitateki Shihai Ken is limited to 
Yūtai Butsu (JAPANESE CIVIL CODE, art. 85). . . . There cannot 
exist the concept “Mutai Butsu” [intangible thing] under 
JAPANESE CIVIL CODE. Furthermore, the Bukken [real right] 
as the Haitateki Shihai Ken for Butsu [thing] must be created 
by JAPANESE CIVIL CODE or other legislations (“Bukken 
Houtei Syugi”) [Policy that real rights must be established by 
legislation]; JAPANESE CIVIL CODE, art. 175). Thus, in order 
to create a right having Haitateki Shihai Ken akin to the 
Bukken and to grant Haitateki Shihai Ken for “Mutai no” 
[intangible] information derived from human, each intellectual 
property act such as Japanese Patent Act and Japanese 
Copyright Act has been enacted as special act of JAPANESE 
CIVIL CODE. 
Takabayashi, supra note 58, at 3 (2005). 
60 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 112. Similar provisions of 
injunctive relief exist in other IP acts.  
17
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order to obtain injunctive relief in addition to the damages 
available under tort law. 
 
2. Case Law Enlarging the Scope of a Principal Committing 
Copyright Infringement 
 
In cases in which an indirect actor’s liability for copyright 
infringement is contended, courts in the past would flexibly 
enlarge the scope of the principal committing such copyright 
infringement. The origin of this practice is called the Karaoke rule, 
which was originally adopted to decide whether a manager of a 
traditional Japanese Karaoke bar61 was liable for infringement of 
the “right of performance”62 on copyrighted musical works when it 
provided occasions for its customers to perform such works.63
Copyright holders wanted to charge the manager of such a 
Karaoke bar instead of an individual customer. Thus, the 
establishment of a copyright infringement claim against a Karaoke 
bar manager was discussed. The Supreme Court in JASRAC 
(Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and 
Publishers) v. Ju San Fou (“Club Cat’s-eye”)
  
64
                                                                                                         
61 At a karaoke bar, it sets a karaoke device that can perform musical works 
and/or videos showing their lyrics and background movies by running tangible 
recording media (cassette tape, laser discs, etc.) or through online. Using the 
karaoke device, the customers enjoy singing songs with their accompaniments. 
 concluded that the 
manager was a principal of performance on the ground that: (1) the 
customers’ performance was made under the manager’s 
management through inducement to sing by the employees, 
selecting musical works within the scope of karaoke cassette tapes 
62 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 22 (“The author shall have the 
exclusive right to perform his work publicly (“publicly” means for the purpose 
of making a work seen or heard directly by the public…).”). 
63 See Takeshi Mizuno, Karaoke Bansō ni yoru Kyaku no Kashō ni tsuki 
Karaoke Souchi wo Setti Shita Sunakku tou no Keieisha ga Ensōuken Shingai ni 
yoru Fuhoukoui Sekinin wo Ou tosareta Jirei [Case Holding that the Manager 
of Bar, etc. Who Set the Karaoke Device Is Liable under Tort Theory for 
Infringement of Performance Right as to Singing by Customers with 
Accompaniment by Karaoke], Saikō Saibansho Hanrei Kaisetsu Minji Hen 
[Commentary of the Supreme Court’s Civil Cases](for the year 1988) 150, 158 
(1990). 
64 It was the name of the defendant’s karaoke bar.  
18
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set by the manager and manipulating the karaoke device by the 
employees; and that (2) the manager earned a commercial benefit 
through the customers’ performance.65 The court emphasized two 
factors: (1) management and (2) commercial benefit.66
Beyond the Karaoke bar case, the Karaoke rule has been more 
broadly applied to other kinds of services when the provider is 
merely an indirect actor, but the customers directly exploit 
particular copyrighted works (the so-called “variation”
  
67  of the 
Karaoke rule).68 For example, a file sharing service using peer-to-
peer technology was held illegal under the Karaoke rule in 
JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō (“File Rogue”).69
                                                                                                         
65 See JASRAC v. Ju San Fou, 1270 HANREI JIHŌ 34, 35-36 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 
15, 1988) (emphasis added). 
 Also, recently, a 
66 Many subsequent courts applied this rule in Club Cat’s-eye to the similar 
cases. See, e.g., JASRAC v. Mitsumasa Iritani, 753 HANREI TAIMUZU 217 
(Takamatsu Dis. Ct., Jan. 29, 1991) (“Maharaja”); JASRAC v. Ēsu K.K., 29-1 
CHITEKI SAISHŪ 230 (Osaka Dis. Ct., Mar. 17, 1994) (“Miruku” in first 
instance); JASRAC v. Ēsu K.K., 29-1 CHITEKI SAISHŪ 213 (Osaka High Ct., 
Feb. 27, 1997) (“Miruku” in appellate instance); JASRAC v. Bideo Meitsu Ltd., 
55 MINSHŪ 185, 1744 HANREI JIHŌ 108 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 2, 2001) (“Night Pub 
G7”). 
67 In Japanese, it is called “tenyō” of the Karaoke rule. Tamura, supra note 
54, at 42, 51. 
68 Id. at 51. Professor Yoshiyuki Tamura indicated, “the Karaoke rule was 
originally applied to the entities of which it can be said that there is some 
personal relationship and personal instructions with the direct using actor, such 
as a karaoke bar, a cabaret, or an organizer of performance, a projector, etc.” Id. 
at 43. 
69 The service name was “File Rogue.” Some lower courts handled this 
case. All their decisions adopted the Karaoke rule and held that the service 
provider is liable for its users’ direct infringing conduct. 
Preliminary injunction cases: JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., 1780 
HANREI JIHŌ 25 (Tokyo D. Ct., Apr. 11, 2002); Nihon Koromubia K.K. v. 
Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., 1780 HANREI JIHŌ 25 (Tokyo D. Ct., Apr. 9, 2002). 
Principal case [First instance]: JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070319112218.pdf (Tokyo D. 
Ct., Jan. 29, 2003[Heisei14(wa)4237]), Koromubia Myūjikku Enter Teinment 
K.K. v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070319112454.pdf (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 29, 
2003[Heisei14(wa) 4249]). 
Principal case [Appellate instance]: JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., 
available at 
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website for posting and sharing videos was held illegal under the 
Karaoke rule in JASRAC v. Just Online K.K. (“TV Break”). 70
Such variation of the Karaoke rule has appeared in Japan 
because of its two main merits: (1) a copyright holder can benefit 
from injunctive relief according to Article 112 of the Japanese 
Copyright Act because the Karaoke rule is directed to the issue of 
who is a principal committing copyright infringement; and (2) a 
copyright holder can establish a copyright infringement claim 
against a service provider even if its customers’ (the direct actors) 
physical exploitation of copyrighted works is not regarded as 
illegal according to the limitations of copyright, such as the  
private use limitation of the reproduction right.
 
Furthermore, as will be introduced later in this Article, some courts 
have applied the Karaoke rule or its variation to the placeshifting 
cases. Thus, Japanese courts have expanded the scope of direct 
liability, rather than expanding indirect liability, as U.S. courts 
have done.   
71
 
  
3. Limitation on the Reproduction Right for Private Use 
 
The Japanese Copyright Act has no general fair use exception 
like the United States. Instead, Japan has explicitly enumerated 
limitation provisions depending on each kind of bundle rights and 
relevant exploitations.72
One such limitation is the private use limitation for the 
  
                                                                                                         
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/7D3D6DF1C0477173492570FC00022330.p
df (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Mar. 31, 2005 [Heisei16(ne)405]); Koromubia Myūjikku 
Enter Teinment K.K. v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/E7A0B43CB0275AA9492570FC00022333.
pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Mar. 31, 2005 [Heisei16(ne) 446]). 
70 The service name is “TV Break” (formerly, “Pandora TV”).  
First instance: JASRAC v. Just Online K.K., available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20091215170834.pdf (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov. 
13, 2009). 
Appellate instance: JASRAC v. Just Online K.K., available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20100909131245.pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct., 
Sep. 8, 2010). 
71 See Tamura, supra note 54, at 37-38. 
72 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 30-50. Furthermore, most of 
these limitations are also applied to neighboring rights. Id. art. 102. 
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reproduction right,73
Article 30. (1) It shall be permissible for a user to 
reproduce by himself a work forming the subject 
matter of copyright . . . for the purpose of her 
personal use, family use or other similar uses within 
a limited circle (hereinafter referred to as “private 
use”) . . . 
 which exempts the liability for reproducing a 
copyrighted work for the purpose of private use:  
74
According to such limitation, each customer of certain Internet-
related services should not be liable for infringement of the 
reproduction right provided the use is for a “private use.”
 
75
  
 Even if 
each customer is exempted from liability based on such a 
limitation, however, a service provider still may be liable for the 
customer’s exploitation of the particular copyrighted works under 
the Karaoke rule or its variation. 
                                                                                                         
73 Id. art. 30.  
74 Id. art. 30(1) (emphasis added).  
75 For example, in the file sharing service using peer-to-peer technology, if a 
user who downloads the illegal data of a musical work and makes a copy on her 
or his own PC only for the purpose of listening to it personally, such 
reproducing behavior may fall within the “private use.” However, please note 
that, after 2009 revision of the Japanese Copyright Act, the user must be illegal 
if she or he is aware of infringement at the time of downloading. See id. art. 
30(1)(iii). 
21
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III. U.S. CASE LAW REGARDING PLACESHIFTING - CABLEVISION  
 
A.  Background 
 
In the United States, the Second Circuit recently addressed the 
legality of a placeshifting service. In Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings (Cablevision), defendant Cablevision was an operator of 
a cable television system called the “Remote Storage Digital Video 
Recorder” (RS-DVR) 76  The RS-DVR allowed Cablevision 
customers to record cable programming on central hard drives 
housed and maintained by Cablevision at a remote location.77 The 
customers could then play back those programs through their home 
television sets, using only a remote control and a standard cable 
box equipped with the RS-DVR software.78 The plaintiffs, who 
owned copyrights on various movies and television programs, sued 
Cablevision for declaratory and injunctive relief.79
The central device of Cablevision’s RS-DVR was the Arroyo 
Server. The Arroyo Server consisted of two data buffers
 
80 and a 
number of high-capacity hard disks. 81 The entire stream of TV 
program data moved to the first buffer regardless of whether any 
customers requested to record that program.82 If a certain customer 
had requested a particular program, the data of that requested 
program moved from the first buffer to the secondary buffer, and 
then onto a portion of one of the hard disks allocated to that 
customer.83 Even when different customers requested to record the 
same television program simultaneously, “separate copies [were] 
made for each requesting customer.”84
                                                                                                         
76 See Figure 1, Appendix.  
 The first buffer held the 
data for each television program at any moment for no more than 
77 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Buffers are “forms of random access memory that hold data for a brief 
amount of time, usually shortly before use, typically to improve the performance 
of the computer or other digital device.” Woodford, supra note 7, at 5. 
81 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Woodford, supra note 7, at 6. 
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0.1 seconds, and the second buffer held the data for no more than 
1.2 seconds. 85  After that, the data residing on the buffers was 
automatically erased and replaced with newer data.86
According to a customer’s request, the Arroyo Server 
transmitted its data to the customer.
 
87 As a result, the customer was 
able to view the requested program every time and everywhere as 
long as he or she was connected with the Internet.88 In contrast, if 
there was no request to record, the data in the first buffer would be 
automatically overwritten and deleted without moving to the 
second buffer or any portion of the hard disks.89
In Cablevision, interestingly, the parties voluntarily limited the 
issue only to direct infringement.
  
90
(1) the reproduction right by recording TV program 
data in a buffer of the Arroyo Server; 
 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Cablevision directly infringed:  
(2) the reproduction right by recording programs in 
HDs allocated for each customer; and  
(3) the public performance right by transmitting the 
recorded program data to customers.91
 
 
                                                                                                         
85 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124-25. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Prior to filing a lawsuit, through mutual bargaining, the plaintiffs agreed 
not to argue secondary liability. In consideration, Cablevision agreed not to 
argue the fair use defense. The parties’ intent was to “use this case to ‘set a 
standard for copyright protection in the marketplace of automated access to and 
delivery of copyrighted works.’” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
Cable News Network v. CSC Holdings, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), at 
11. Also, the plaintiffs were unwilling to suggest that private use of DVRs 
violated the rights of the audience. See Jon M. Garon, Colloquium: The Second 
Annual Conference on Innovation and Communication Law, 48 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 771, 784 (2010).  
91 See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 125; see also Attorney General’s Amicus 
brief, 129 S. Ct. 2890 at (I). 
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B.  The District Court Decision 
 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs 
on all three issues and granted their request for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.92
 
 
C.  The Second Circuit Decision 
 
The Second Circuit reversed/vacated the district court’s 
decision, denying the establishment of direct infringement for all 
three issues. 93
 
 The most relevant issue with relationship to the 
volition requirement is issue two (concerning recording in HDs). 
This Article will now compare this issue with Japanese law. 
1. The Volition Standard 
 
The core of issue two concerns “the authorship of the 
infringing conduct.”94  In the recording process of RS-DVR, “a 
copy of the program – a copyrighted work – resides on the hard 
disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server.”95 Thus, the central question 
was “who made this copy;”96 in other words, who [was] the maker 
of such a copy, Cablevision or its customer?97 If Cablevision made 
the copy, then it directly infringed the reproduction right of the 
plaintiffs’ works; if its customer made the copy, then Cablevision 
would not be liable for direct infringement, although it may face a 
secondary liability claim.98
As a standard for deciding this issue, the Second Circuit 
applied the volition requirement from Netcom, which stated, “there 
should still be some element of volition or causation which is 
 
                                                                                                         
92 Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Cablevision Sys., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
93 See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Woodford, supra note 7, at 8. 
98 See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 130. 
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lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy 
by a third party.”99 The Second Circuit drew its reasoning from the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 100
[T]o establish direct liability under . . . the Act, 
something more must be shown than mere 
ownership of a machine used by others to make 
illegal copies. There must be actual infringing 
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal 
to the illegal copying that one could conclude that 
the machine owner himself trespassed on the 
exclusive domain of the copyright holder.
which 
had endorsed Netcom:  
101
2. Application of the Volition Standard to Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
 
 
Applying the volition standard, the Second Circuit identified 
two volitional acts in the RS-DVR context: (1) “Cablevision’s 
conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists 
only to produce a copy;” and (2) “a customer’s conduct in ordering 
that system to produce a copy of a specific program.”102
In the case of a VCR, it seems clear … that the 
operator of the VCR, the person who actually 
presses the button to make the recording, supplies 
the necessary element of volition, not the person 
who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from 
the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe 
that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently 
distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability 
as a direct infringer on a different party for copies 
that are made automatically upon that customer’s 
 The court 
assessed these volitional acts between Cablevision and its 
customers in the RS-DVR and held that they were the same as 
those in a VCR, where its maker may not be liable for direct 
infringement concerning its users’ infringing act by the recorder:   
                                                                                                         
99 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (emphasis added). 
100 CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, 550-55 (4th Cir. 2004). 
101 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 130 (citing CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550). 
102 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131. 
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command.103
Also, considering the volitional conduct in this case, the court 
distinguished the RS-DVR from a copy shop service whereby an 
employee of the shop makes copies of a certain book from a 
customer’s request to make a copy.
 
104
Further, although the district court emphasized Cablevision’s 
“unfettered discretion in selecting the programming that it would 
make available for recording,”
 
105 the Second Circuit denied that 
such discretion should affect the issue of direct infringement. 
Accordingly, it held that Cablevision’s discretion did not extend to 
selecting to record a particular program and was less than that of a 
video-on-demand provider.106
 
 
In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that Cablevision did not 
commit any volitional conduct by copying the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted television programs on hard disks of the Arroyo 
                                                                                                         
103 Id.  
104  The court stated:  
In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant 
difference exists between making a request to a human 
employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system 
to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, 
which automatically obeys commands and engages in no 
volitional conduct…. Here, by selling access to a system that 
automatically produces copies on command, Cablevision more 
closely resembles a store proprietor who charges customers to 
use a photocopier on his premises, and it seems incorrect to 
say, without more, that such a proprietor “makes” any copies 
when his machines are actually operated by his customers. 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131-32 (emphasis added). 
105 Cablevision, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
106  The court stated that  
[T]his control is limited to the channels of programming 
available to a customer and not to the programs themselves. 
Cablevision has no control over what programs are made 
available on individual channels or when those programs will 
air, if at all. In this respect, Cablevision possesses far less 
control over recordable content than it does in the video on 
demand context, where it actively selects and makes available 
beforehand the individual programs available for viewing. 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132. 
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Server, and thus Cablevision should not be liable for direct 
infringement of the reproduction right. 
D.  The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari 
 
Although the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, the 
Court denied certiorari on June 29, 2009,107 as recommended by 
the Solicitor General in an amicus brief.108
 
 
E.  Remaining Problems of Volition Standard in Cablevision109
 
  
1. Significance of the Volition Standard in Cablevision 
 
The Second Circuit in Cablevision became the first federal 
                                                                                                         
107 Cable News Network v. CSC Holdings, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
108 The Solicitor General stated that Cablevision is not suitable for the US 
Supreme Court’s uniform decision because two other “critical issues” – 
contributory infringement and fair use – had been removed by the parties such 
that the Supreme Court cannot wholly address these critical issues. See Attorney 
General’s Amicus brief, 129 S. Ct. 2890, at 6. 
109  There are some articles annotating Cablevision. See, e.g., [U.S.] 
Woodford, supra note 7; Ginsburg, supra note 34; Irene M. Pla, This Picture Is 
Coming in Fussy: Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings Blurs the Line between 
Direct and Secondary Copyright Infringement, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 85 (2010); 
Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, 89 OR. L. REV. 505 (2010); Fernando M. Pinguelo and Bradford 
W. Muller, Avoid the Rainy Day: Survey of U.S. Cloud Computing Caselaw, 
2011 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 011101 (2011), Joshua C. Liederman, 
Changing the Channel: The Copyright Fixation Debate, 36 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 289 (2011); [Japan] Kōji Okumura, Nettowākugata 
DVR Sisutemu no Uneisya ga Chokusetsu Shingai Sekinin wo Ouka Inaka ga 
Arasowareta Beikoku Jirei [Whether or Not an Operator of Network-Type DVR 
System is Liable for Direct Infringement] - The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F.3d 121 2nd Cir. 2008), 117 SOFTIC LAW NEWS 
(2008); Yukiko Sakai, Beikoku CableVision Hanketsu to Nichibei no 
Chosakuken Shingai Sekinin nitaisuru Kangaekata-Liability for Copyright 
Infringement on Cablevision Case and Its Implication for Japan, 49 INFOCOM 
REVIEW 37 (2009); Takashi Yamada, Beikoku Chizai Jūyō Hanrei Syōkai: 
Nettowaaku wo Riyō Shita Hōsōrokuga･Soushin Saabisu to Chosakuken Shingai 
no Seihi [Whether or Not the Service of Recording and Transmitting Broadcasts 
through Network Infringes Copyright]-The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc. US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-, 37-6 Kokusai Shōji 
Hōmu 828 (2009).  
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appellate court to apply the volition requirement to “services not 
accessible via the internet.”110 Requiring this volition element, the 
court “found no substantive difference between supplying a free-
standing recording device that a user operates at home and 
supplying a remote digital recording system that the user operates 
from home.” 111  As a result, it can be said that Cablevision 
diminished uncertainty regarding the legality of the placeshifting 
service.112
 
 
2. Criticism of the Volition Requirement in Cablevision 
 
The district court in Cablevision refused to adopt the volition 
requirement, differentiating the placeshifting in Cablevision from 
the ISP in Netcom.113 The ISP at issue in Netcom was a “‘mere 
conduit’ online service provider, which simply conveyed copies of 
works from one subscriber to another.” 114  In contrast, 
“Cablevision’s own transmissions [were] the source of the copies 
the subscribers request.”115
                                                                                                         
110  Woodford, supra note 
 Thus, the district court reasoned that 
Cablevision had more power to control the content stream; in other 
7, at 8. The case decisions requiring the volition 
element before Cablevision are related to the ISP’s liability. See supra note 40. 
111  Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15. 
112  Prof. Ginsburg says,  
The Second Circuit’s determination that a business which 
establishes and manages an automated system that invites end 
users to request the making of copies which it stores for the 
users for subsequent communication to them lacks the agency 
sufficient for direct liability for infringement of the 
reproduction right, and could herald the development of 
business models designed to elude copyright control over the 
exploitation of works, particularly in a technological 
environment in which pervasive automation is increasingly 
foreseeable. 
Id. Also, Mr. Zimmerman and Mr. Woodford indicated the volition requirement 
in Cablevision is important because it succeeds in making uncertainty of the 
DMCA safe harbor (17 U.S.C. §512) less relevant to the extent of direct 
infringement for technology companies and entertainment conduits. See 
Woodford, supra note 7, at 10. 
113 See Cablevision, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
114 Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15. 
115 Id. 
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words, Cablevision had an option not only to distribute, but also to 
remove, any content if it found that such content would constitute 
copyright infringement.116
However, “Cablevision’s ‘continuing relationship’ with its RS-
DVR customers, its control over recordable content, and the 
‘instrumental[ity]’ of copying to the RS-DVR system . . . seem . . . 
more relevant to the question of contributory liability.”
 
117 They do 
not relate to Cablevision’s direct infringement liability because, in 
a direct infringement claim, the court should decide whether a 
defendant service provider makes “copies” of a particular 
copyrighted work by itself. Even if a provider has power to control 
the general content stream, such power does not necessarily mean 
that the provider makes “copies” of a particular copyrighted work. 
Thus, it should not be relevant to the direct infringement issue.118
 
 
3. Secondary Liability of a Placeshifting Provider 
 
The Solicitor General stated in its amicus brief that secondary 
liability can be another legal issue in these situations.119 However, 
the outcome seems to be negative because, in order to establish the 
secondary liability claim, there must be an illegal direct 
infringement.120  Nonetheless, a general customer of the RS-
DVR might establish a fair use defense for his or her conduct 
under the well-established doctrine in Sony121 as long as it uses the 
service for a private use.122
In discussing the establishment of fair use, the impact by the 
placeshifting service on the television content market may be 
 Accordingly, Cablevision might not be 
secondarily liable. 
                                                                                                         
116 See Cablevision, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
117 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132; see also Woodford, supra note 7, at 10.  
118 See Woodford, supra note 7, at 9. 
119 See supra note 108. 
120 See supra Chapter II.A.2.b.  
121 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-56. 
122 That is because the customer’s placeshifting use in the RS-DVR has 
little difference from the timeshifting use of Sony’s Betamax. See Woodford, 
supra note 7, at 10; Bartley, supra note 49, at 558-59; Pla, supra note 109, at 
102. 
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considerable.123
[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the 
potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted 
work need not be prohibited in order to protect the 
author’s incentive to create. . . . A challenge to a 
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires 
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that 
if it should become widespread, it would adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted 
work.
 Because the placeshifting service is so convenient 
and attractive for many audiences, it could have some effect on the 
existing content market. However, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Sony:  
124
Thus, it is possible that the placeshifting use by an individual 
user may fall within fair use until any substantial harm on the 
television content market is proven. Furthermore, because the 
placeshifting service “only provides access to the same video that 
is available on a home television, and Internet content providers 
can offer greater options,”
  
125 the placeshifting might still be fair 
use like the Betamax in Sony, even though the RS-DVR will have 
some market impact.126
                                                                                                         
123 The impact of the placeshifting service on the TV contents market can 
be considered in the fourth factor of fair use exception. See 17 U.S.C. §107(4) 
(“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”.). Ms. Sakai indicates, “[i]n the case of the library purpose 
that a customer records for the purpose of viewing continuously later, there is a 
possibility that such conduct would not be deemed as fair use if it affects the 
package market such as a video cassette or a DVD according to the 
consideration in the US.” Sakai, supra note 
 Therefore, even if copyright holders sued 
Cablevision for contributory infringement, Cablevision might not 
109, at 49.   
124 Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51. 
125 Bartley, supra note 49, at 558. 
126 Id. at 558-59; see also Rivers, supra note 4, at 188-91. Professor Rivers 
introduced possible policies in favor of affirming fair use. According to her, they 
are “to prevent the chilling innovation . . . that it is undermined whether 
copyright owners have or will suffer any net damages as a result of placeshifting 
technologies” and “that it encourages mobility among the populace, and that 
banning it would suppress one’s constitutional right to travel.” Id. at 188-91. 
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be liable if the plaintiffs are unable to prove market harm.127
4. Hypothetical Cases where Placeshifting Might Be Illegal under 
the Volition Requirement 
 
 
Even under the volition requirement in Cablevision, every 
placeshifting service may not necessarily be legal. So, under what 
circumstances might a placeshifting service be illegal? If a 
placeshifting provider allows its customers to record and view 
unlicensed television programs, such circumstance can justify 
liability for copyright infringement. 128
 
 This is because the 
provider, in these hypothetical assumptions, stores and distributes 
on demand the content that each customer should individually 
obtain authorization from the copyright holder to view.  
5. Conclusion 
 
The volition requirement might be a preferable tool to reduce 
the uncertainty of liability for placeshifting services. Under this 
requirement, a placeshifting provider can offer its service legally, 
like Cablevision, by creating a service structure where the copying 
of a specific copyright work automatically occurs at the demand of 
                                                                                                         
127 See Woodford, supra note 7, at 10; Pla, supra note 109, at 102-05. But 
see Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 17. Professor Ginsburg indicated a possibility 
that the case law may deny establishment of fair use defense if business entity 
does copy on behalf of its user. Id. at 17. Also, Professor Brunstad has indicated 
the possibility that contributory liability can be established on a service provider 
of placeshifting according to US law. Jonathan Griffith & Signe Brunstad, 
RCLIP Tokubetsu Seminā – Hōsō Kontentsu no Tensō wo Meguru Shisutemu 
Teikyosya Tou no Chosakuken Hō Jyō no Sekinin – Eibei no Jōkyō wo Humaete 
[RCLIP Special Seminar – Liability of Provider of System Regarding 
Transmission of Broadcast Contents under Copyright Law– Considering 
Situations in the UK and the US], in Chizai Nenpō 2008 (NBL Supplement No. 
123) [IP Annual Report 2008 (Bessatsu NBL No. 1123)] 309, 329 (2008). 
 However, even according to Professor Ginsburg, it is still unclear 
which circumstances cause the conclusion that the customer’s non-commercial 
copying conduct in RS-DVR does not constitute fair use. 
128 See Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 16. Professor Ginsburg also indicates, 
“[i]f Cablevision simply redirected the signal to those customers, it would be 
directly liable for violating the copyright owner’s public performance rights.” Id. 
at 16-17. 
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each customer.129
 
  
IV. JAPANESE CASE LAW REGARDING PLACESHIFTING  
 
A.  Background 
 
Table 1 at the end of this Article shows the outcome of 
Japanese cases regarding placeshifting.130
 
 In Japan, meanwhile, the 
legality of placeshifting services centers mainly on whether a 
service provider falls within the definition of a principal 
committing copyright infringement, because there is no secondary 
liability theory in Japanese copyright law. Most courts have 
applied an overall consideration standard such as the Karaoke rule 
or its variation to this issue. Because courts apply an overall 
consideration standard, however, it is difficult to find the critical 
factor that would make a placeshifting service legal or illegal.  
B.  Rokuga Net131
 
  
1. Facts132
 
 
Rokuga Net was a service that enabled its customers who lived 
abroad to view Japanese television programs. 133
                                                                                                         
129 Also, in Cablevision, the Second Circuit held no infringement of public 
performance right by transmitting the recorded program data from a central 
server to each customer. A service provider can benefit from that holding. 
 The service 
provider was FA Vision, Inc. The provider placed personal 
computers called “TV-personal computers” together with 
130 See Table 1, Appendix.  
131 First instance: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. FA Vision, 1895 HANREI JIHŌ 120 
(Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 7, 2004). 
 Objection instance: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. FA Vision, Unpublished 
(Tokyo D. Ct., May 31, 2005). 
 Appellate instance: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. FA Vision, available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/842BD42DCC4020FC492570C100253DFF.
pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Nov. 15, 2005). 
132 See Rokuga Net, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
842BD42DCC4020FC492570C100253DFF.pdf, at 1-4 [Appellate instance]. 
133 See Figure 2, Appendix.  
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television tuners having the function of receiving and recording 
television programs at its office. FA Vision allocated the TV-
personal computers to each user, and connected them with a 
television antenna to enable them to receive television programs. 
Each user operated his or her own TV-personal computer from 
home through the Internet to reserve recordings of programs and 
could transmit the recorded files to his or her own personal 
computer located at home or even overseas. In addition, FA Vision 
and its customers agreed that each customer owned the TV-
personal computer allocated to that user. Another characteristic of 
this service was that each user must access FA Vision’s website 
with a password to request the recording and transmitting of TV 
programs.  
The Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japanese Broadcasting Enterprise) 
sued FA Vision, seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin FA 
Vision from infringing the organization’s “reproduction right.”134
 
  
2. Court Decisions  
 
 The Tokyo District Court found that FA Vision was the 
principal committing infringement of the “reproduction right,” and 
granted an injunction.135 The Intellectual Property High Court136 
(IPHC) affirmed the district court’s decision137
                                                                                                         
134 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 
 and concluded that 
FA Vision was the principal committing infringement of the 
“reproduction right” by wholly considering the  actions, or lack 
3, art. 98. 
135 See Rokuga Net, 1895 HANREI JIHŌ at 127 [First instance]. 
136 The Intellectual Property High Court is one of the courts of appeal in 
Japan. It “was established on April 1, 2005 as a court specializing in intellectual 
property cases, which consists of the Special Division to deal with Grand Panel 
cases and other four divisions.” Intellectual Property High Court, 
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/aboutus/current.html (last visited May 26, 2011). 
 Unlike the US court of appeal, the Japanese court of appeal is basically 
allowed not only to review the lower court’s decisions but also to do fact-finding 
by themselves. Depending on the case, the Japanese courts of appeal may hear 
witnesses.. See MAKOTO ITŌ, MINJI SOSYŌ HŌ [CIVIL PROCEDURE], 630-31 
(rev. ed. 2002). 
137 See Rokuga Net, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
842BD42DCC4020FC492570C100253DFF.pdf, at 6 [Appellate instance]. 
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thereof, of Rokuga Net, such as: (1) all related apparatuses were 
owned and installed by FA Vision in its office (the court held the 
agreement that the customer owned the TV-personal computer to 
be merely fictitious); (2) FA Vision limited the scope of broadcast 
programs which could be transmitted; (3) a customer could not use 
the service without accessing FA Vision’s website each time; (4) 
FA Vision continuously gave support service to its customers; and 
(5) FA Vision advertised its service and received profits through 
service fees termed monthly maintenance fees.138
                                                                                                         
138 See id. at 4-5 [Appellate instance]. 
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C.  Maneki TV139
1. Facts
 
140
 
 
Like Rokuga Net, Maneki TV was a service that enabled its 
                                                                                                         
139 Preliminary injunction case [First instance]: Nihon Terebi Hōsō Mō 
K.K. v. Nagano Syōten, 1234 HANREI TAIMUZU 278 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 4, 
2006). 
Preliminary injunction case [Appellate instance]: Nihon Terebi Hōsō Mō 
K.K. v. Nagano Syōten K.K., available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20061222154234.pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct., 
Dec. 22, 2006). 
Principal case [First instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nagano Syōten K.K., 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080623111341.pdf (Tokyo D. 
Ct., June 20, 2008). 
Principal case [Appellate instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nagano Syōten 
K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf 
(INTELL. HIGH Ct., Dec. 15, 2008). 
Principal case [Supreme Court]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nagano Syōten 
K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110118164443.pdf 
(Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 2011). 
There are some articles annotating Maneki TV. See, e.g., Fumio Sakka, 
Hōsō Bangumi no Rokuga/Haishin Sarbisu to Chosakuken Seido – Shiteki Riyō 
to Gyō Teki Riyō no Kyōkai Ryōiki no Chitsujyo Keisei – [Services of Recording 
and Distributing Broadcasting Programs and Copyright System – Establishment 
of an Order for Border Area between Private Use and Commercial Use], 576 
Kopiraito [Copyright] 33 (2009); Yutaka Sato, Chosakubutsu no Tekihouriyou 
notameno Syudanteikyou no Zehi -Rokuraku II Jiken Kousoshin Hanketsu wo 
Daizai ni– [Whether Providing Means for Legal Use of Copyrighted Work 
Should be Allowed or Not –Considering the Decision by Court of Appeal in 
Rokuraku II Case-], 26 Chitekizaisan Houseisakugaku Kenkyu 75, 98 (2010); 
Yutaka Sato, “Terebi Hōsō wo Internet Kaisen wo Keiyusite Shichōsuru 
Sityōsuru Sisutemu” wo Siyōsurutameno Setsubi Teikyō no Zehi – Maneki TV 
jiken – [Whether Providing Facilities for Use for the “System of Viewing TV 
Programs through Internet Networking” Should be Allowed or Not – Maneki TV 
case - ], 15 Chitekizaisan Houseisakugaku Kenkyu 243 (2007); Keiji Kondō, 
Zaikyō Hōsō no Kaigai Shichō Kanōka to Chosakuken Hō – Maneki TV jiken 
[Making National Broadcasts Viewable Abroad and Copyright Law], 44 LAW & 
TECH. 57 (2009), Tetsuya Imamura, Terebi Hōsō wo Internet Kaisen wo 
Keiyushite Setsuzoku Suru Shisutemu wo Siyō Suru Tame no Setsubi Teikyō no 
Tekihōsei ga Arasowareta Jirei [Case Discussing the Legality of Providing 
Facilities to Use a System of Viewing TV Broadcasts through Internet Network], 
Apr. 6, 2009, LEX/DB No. 25440151. 
140 See Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
20080623111341.pdf, at 3-7, 70-84 [First instance of principal case]. 
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customers who lived abroad to view Japanese television 
programs.141 The service provider was Nagano Syōten K.K. The 
most characteristic feature of Maneki TV was the use of a 
commercially available placeshifting device called “Location 
Free,” made by Sony.142 Location Free consisted of a device called 
a “Base Station” that converted television broadcasts into digital 
data and transmitted them to a customer’s personal viewing device 
through an individual customer’s remote control.143
Thus, Nagano Syōten did not provide the Location Free device 
to its customers.
 In Maneki TV, 
a customer must purchase the Location Free device on his or her 
own and then must deliver it to Nagano Syōten.  
144 Nagano Syōten only provided its office as a 
place to connect the Base Stations. Unlike the RS-DVR in 
Cablevision, Nagano Syōten did not operate any sole central server 
device, but instead set multiple Base Stations delivered to them by 
each customer. The other characteristic of this service was that the 
Base Station had only a transmitting function and no recording 
function. Therefore, only the issues of whether Maneki TV 
infringes the “right of public transmission” 145 and the “right of 
making a work transmittable” 146
                                                                                                         
141  See Figure 3, Appendix.  
 were discussed. The “right of 
142 See supra note 20. 
143 A customer can substitute his own personal computer connected to the 
Internet for the personal viewer device. 
144 Nagano Syōten merely posted an Internet link to Sony’s website, which 
introduces Location Free, on its own homepage. 
145 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1). Article 2(1)(viibis) 
defined the “public transmission” as:  
the transmission of radio communication or wire-
telecommunication intended for direct reception by the public, 
excluding the transmission (other than that of program works) 
by telecommunication installations, one part of which is 
located on the same premises where the other part is located 
or, if the premises are occupied by two or more persons, both 
parts of which are located within the area therein occupied by 
one person. 
(emphasis added). 
146 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1) and art. 99bis. Article 
2(1)(viibis) defined the “making transmittable” as: 
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making a work transmittable” is the right to prevent an infringer’s 
act of uploading illegal contents as prior stage of public 
transmission, which in turn is covered by the “right of public 
transmission.”147
 
 
2. Court Decisions  
 
In Maneki TV, a total of four lower-court decisions were 
issued, both in the preliminary-injunction case148 and the principal 
case. 149
                                                                                                         
[T]he putting in such a state that the interactive 
transmission can be made by either of the following acts:  
 All lower courts concluded that Maneki TV did not 
(a) to record information on public transmission memory 
of an interactive transmission server already connected with 
telecommunication networks for public use (“interactive 
transmission server” means a device which, when connected 
with telecommunication networks for public use, has a 
function of making the interactive transmission of information 
which is either recorded on such a part of its memory as used 
for the interactive transmission (hereinafter in this item 
referred to as “public transmission memory”) or inputted to 
such device; the same shall apply hereinafter), to add a 
memory recording information as a public transmission 
memory of such an interactive transmission server, to convert 
such a memory recording information into a public 
transmission memory of such an interactive transmission 
server, or to input information to such an interactive 
transmission server;  
(b) to connect with telecommunication networks for 
public use an interactive transmission server which records 
information on its public transmission memory or which 
inputs information to itself. In this case, where a connection is 
made through a series of acts such as wiring, starting of an 
interactive transmission server or putting into operation of 
programs for transmission or reception, the last occurring one 
of these acts shall be considered to constitute the connection. 
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, Article 2(1)(viibis).. 
147 As a result, copyright holder may more efficiently prevent an illegal 
public transmission of his copyright work. 
148 In a preliminary injunction case, a petitioner of “preliminary injunction” 
may seek only interim injunction against an infringer.  
149 In a principal case (meaning a general civil lawsuit), a plaintiff may 
seek both permanent injunction and monetary damage. 
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infringe the “right of making a work transmittable” or the “right of 
public transmission.”  
 
a. Early decisions 
 
Two district court decisions and one IPHC decision in the 
preliminary injunction case found that Nagano Syōten was not the 
principal committing copyright infringement by wholly 
considering the contents of Maneki TV. These decisions noted that 
one Base Station only had the function of transmission to one 
individual customer; that is, it made transmission between “1-to-
1,” but not between “1-to-many.” 150 Thus, these three decisions 
have been considered as examples of a variation of the Karaoke 
rule.151
 
 
b. Intellectual Property High Court’s decision in the principal 
case 
 
In contrast, the IPHC in the principal case did not directly 
discuss the scope of the principal committing infringement. As to 
the claim of infringement of the “right of making a work 
transmittable,” the IPHC held that the system within Nagano 
Syōten’s office setting each customer’s Base Station did not 
constitute an “interactive transmission server” 152  because “each 
Base Station could only make transmission to a particular and sole 
private monitor or personal computer and merely had the so-called 
‘1 to 1’ transmitting function.”153
Next, as to the claim of infringement of the “right of public 
transmission,” the IPHC held that the transmission from Nagano 
Syōten’s office to many customers through the Internet did not 
  
                                                                                                         
150 See Maneki TV, 1234 HANREI TAIMUZU at 292 [First instance of 
preliminary injunction case], http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
20061222154234.pdf, at 11 [Appellate instance of preliminary injunction case], 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080623111341.pdf, at 87 [First instance of 
principal case]. 
151 Sato, supra note 139, at 75. 
152 See supra note 146. 
153 Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf, 
at 25-26 [Appellate instance of principal case]. 
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constitute such an infringement because: 
[Nagano Syōten] not only never decided to transmit 
the digital data to each user’s monitor or PC 
individually but also was never involved with such a 
decision made by each user. . . .  Whether the 
transmission of digital data from each Base Station 
to the corresponding monitor or PC of each user 
exists or not depended on a decision by each user 
completely.154
c. Supreme Court’s decision in the principal case 
 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the IPHC’s decision and held that 
Nagano Syōten was the principal committing infringement of both 
the “right of making a work transmittable” and the “right of public 
transmission.” The court interpreted “the principal [of interactive 
transmission] as an entity creating a state where a device at issue 
was capable of automatically transmitting information in response 
to a request from a receiver.”155 Further, the court held, “if the 
device was connected with telecommunication networks for public 
use and information was continuously inputted on the device, an 
entity which inputted the information on the device should be 
considered as the principal of transmission.” 156  The court then 
applied this standard to Maneki TV and held that a Base Station157
Because anyone might use [Maneki TV] solely by 
entering into its service contract with [Nagano 
Syōten] regardless of relationship, etc. with it, the 
 
constituted an “interactive transmission server,” and that Nagano 
Syōten was the principal of public transmission because its 
customer fell within the public: 
                                                                                                         
154 Id. at 31-32[Appellate instance of principal case](emphasis added). 
155 Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110118164443.pdf, at 
5 [Supreme Court of principal case]. 
156 Id. (emphasis added). 
157 The Supreme Court stated “each Base Station” but the collection of all 
customer’s Base Stations at the Nagano Syōten’s office. Thus, we can 
understand the Supreme Court held that an individual Base Station constitutes 
an “interactive transmission server.” 
39
Isoda: Copyright Infringement Liability of Placeshifting Services in the
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
188 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:2 
customer fell within the public as an unspecific 
person from the viewpoint of [Nagano Syōten].158
Unlike the IPHC, the Supreme Court held that a Basestation’s 
“1 to 1” transmitting function did not matter.
 
159
 
 
D.  Rokuraku II160
1. Facts
 
161
 
 
 Rokuraku II was similar to Maneki TV in that it had 
individual recording/transmitting devices (named “Parent Device 
Rokuraku,” which is equivalent to the “Base Station” in Maneki 
                                                                                                         
158 Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110118164443.pdf, 
at 5 [Supreme Court of principal case] (emphasis added). 
159 Id. at 6 [Supreme Court of principal case]. 
160 Preliminary injunction case: Tokyo Hōsō K.K. v. Nihon Digital Kaden 
K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070330182742.pdf 
(Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 30, 2007). 
Principal case [First instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nihon Digital Kaden 
K.K., 2029 HANREI JIHŌ 125 (Tokyo D. Ct., May 29, 2008). 
Principal case [Appellate instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nihon Digital 
Kaden K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
20090224172114.pdf (INTELL. HIGH CT., Jan. 27, 2009). 
Principal case [Supreme Court]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nihon Digital 
Kaden K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
20110120144645.pdf (Sup. Ct., Jan. 20, 2011). 
There are some articles annotating Rokuraku II. See, e.g., Sakka, supra note 
139; Sato, supra note 139; Kunitoshi Oka, Zoku/ Chosakuken no Jikenbo (121) 
[Cont. Case List of Copyright (121)], 56-3 JCA JOURNAL 62 (2009); Naoki 
Mizutani, Terebi Hōsō Bangumi no Rokuga, Tensō Sarbisu no Sikumi ga 
Chosakuken Tou wo Shingai Shiteinai to Handan Sareta Jirei [Case Ruling That 
A System of A Service of Recording and Transmitting TV Broadcasting 
Programs Does Not Infringe Copyright, etc.], 106-5 Hatsumei [The Invention] 
40 (2009); Takashi Chōsa, Hanrei Hyōsyaku – “Rokuraku II” Jiken Kōsoshin 
Hanketsu (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Jan. 27, 2009) [Case Review - Appellate Court 
Decision in “Rokuraku II” case (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Jan. 27, 2009)], 62-6 Patent 
29 (2009),;Tetsuya Imamura, Terebi Bangumi Rokuga Sichō Sarbisu ni Okeru 
Fukusei no Syutai ni Tsuite Arasowareta Jirei [Case Discussing the Principal of 
reproducing in a Service of Recording and Viewing TV Programs], Sep. 7, 
2009, LEX/DB No. 25440283. 
161 See Rokuraku II, 2029 HANREI JIHŌ at 127-128, 141-46 [First instance 
of principal case]. 
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TV) allocated to each customer in the service provider’s office.162
In the beginning, Nihon Digital Kaden K.K., the provider of 
Rokuraku II, started by monitoring its business and placed the 
Parent Devices Rokuraku within its office. However, after starting 
its regular service, it contended that the Parent Devices Rokuraku 
were set in a different entity’s office, but not in its own office.  
 
Only the method used for procuring the devices differed. In 
Rokuraku II, the service provider lent to the customer its own 
original products (the Parent Device Rokuraku, which was set in 
the provider’s place, together with a set-top device named the 
“Child Device Rokuraku,” which was set in each customer’s 
home) while, in Maneki TV, each customer had to purchase the 
Location Free including Base Station, a commercially available 
placeshifting device. Furthermore, unlike the Base Station in 
Maneki TV, the Parent Device Rokuraku had both recording and 
transmitting functions. 
Plaintiffs, major television broadcasting companies, sued 
Nihon Digital Kaden, alleging that it infringed their “reproduction 
rights” to the plaintiffs’ TV programs and TV broadcasts. 
 
2. Court Decisions 
 
a. Tokyo District Court’s decision in the principal case  
 
The Tokyo District Court in the principal case held that Nihon 
Digital Kaden was the principal reproducing the TV programs 
through Rokuraku II and granted injunctive relief and monetary 
damages. Referring to the Karaoke rule, the district court reached 
its conclusion by considering that: (i) the purpose of the service 
was to allow its customers to obtain copied data from Japanese TV 
programs; (ii) the Parent Devices Rokuraku were located under 
Nihon Digital Kaden’s management; (iii) Nihon Digital Kaden 
provided its customers the monetary-preferable option to trust 
Nihon Digital Kaden with the Parent Device Rokuraku; (iv) Nihon 
Digital Kaden set the area of recordable TV programs; and (v) 
Nihon Digital Kaden earned the initial registration fee and the 
                                                                                                         
162  See Figure 4, Appendix.  
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rents.163
This decision has been categorized as one of the variations of 
the Karaoke rule.
 
164
 
 
b. Intellectual Property High Court’s decision 
 
The IPHC reversed the district court’s decision. 165  
Contradicting the district court, the IPHC held that the above (i) to 
(v) factors considered by the district court could never be a reason 
to conclude that Nihon Digital Kaden was the principal committed 
infringement of “reproduction rights.”166 The court reasoned that 
Rokuraku II only supported each customer’s legal acts of 
reproduction. That is, the court held that each customer’s 
reproducing acts through the Parent and Child devices “should be 
legal as private use set forth in Article 30(1) of the Japanese 
Copyright Act.”167
merely provided the environment and the conditions 
to ease the legal acts of reproduction by the users’ 
free will. . . . Because this service provided the 
circumstances and the conditions, etc. for the users’ 
legal private use, there was no room that such legal 
acts converted into illegal ones, and thus the 
reasonable benefit of the Appellees [note: copyright 
holders] could not be harmed even if users of 
Rokuraku II would increase and accumulate.
 Then, the court noted that Rokuraku II that:  
168
In addition, the IPHC explicitly denied applying the Karaoke 
rule in Club Cat’s-eye
 
169 on the ground that the factual basis in 
Club Cat’s-eye was clearly different from placeshifting cases.170
                                                                                                         
163 See Id. at 146-50 [First instance of principal case]. 
 
164 See Sato, supra note 139, at 100. 
165 Rokuraku II, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20090224172114.pdf, 
at 33 [Appellate instance of principal case]. 
166 See id. at 25-31. 
167 Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added). 
168 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
169 See infra Chapter II.B.2.  
170 Rokuraku II, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20090224172114.pdf, 
at 33 [Appellate instance of principal case]. 
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c. Supreme Court’s decision 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the IPHC’s decision.171 The court 
applied the overall consideration standard for determining the 
principal conducting a reproduction and then held that the critical 
factor was whether a reproduction of the TV broadcast by a 
reproducing device is made under a service provider’s 
management and control. 172  The Supreme Court remanded the 
case for further judgment on who or how to manage and control 
the Parent Device Rokuraku because Nihon Digital Kaden 
contested that it was not set in its own office.173
 
 
E.  Yoridorimidori174
1. Facts
 
175
 
 
Although service content was different from those of Rokuga 
Net, Maneki TV, and Rokuraku II, Yoridorimidori also held that the 
placeshifting service at issue liable. Yoridorimidori was a central 
system that could record television programs for residents of an 
apartment building.176
                                                                                                         
171 The Supreme Court has three panels. The handling panel in Rokuraku 
II was different from that in Maneki TV. 
 The system consisted of a central server that 
recorded and transmitted the data of television programs and set-
top viewers that were located in each room and received the data, 
converting it to visual and sound signals. Using the viewer, each 
resident could view the recorded programs in his or her own 
apartment. The characteristic of this system was that the central 
server made only one copy of a particular program even if multiple 
172 See Rokuraku II, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110120144645.pdf, at 4 [Supreme Court 
of Principal case].  
173 Id. 
174 First instance: Mainichi Hōsō K.K. v. Kuromusaizu K.K., 1911 
HANREI JIHŌ 65 (Osaka D. Ct., Oct. 24, 2005). 
 Appellate instance: Mainichi Hōsō K.K. v. Kuromusaizu K.K., 1991 
HANREI JIHŌ 122 (Osaka HIGH Ct., June 14, 2007). 
175 See Yoridorimidori, 1991 HANREI JIHŌ at134-36 [Appellate instance]. 
176  See Figure 5, Appendix.  
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residents requested that program. Using only the data from one 
copy, the central server transmitted it to each resident’s viewing 
device. Kuromusaizu K.K., the maker of Yoridorimidori, provided 
fee-based maintenance service by remote control for apartment 
buildings introducing this system.  
 The plaintiffs, television broadcasting companies, sued 
defendant Kuromusaizu, alleging that this system infringed the 
plaintiffs’ “reproduction right,” “right of public transmission,”177 
and “right of making a work transmittable” 178
 
 for their TV 
programs and TV broadcastings.  
2. Court Decisions 
 
a. The Osaka District Court’s decision  
 
 The Osaka District Court held that Kuromusaizu was not 
the principal committing copyright infringement under the 
Karaoke rule. 179  However, the court granted an injunction by 
applying Article 112(1) 180  of the Japanese Copyright Act, a 
statutory basis of injunctive relief, to this case.181 Among Japanese 
case law, such a holding was exceptional because the court 
extended the Copyright Act to reach a new situation by analogy.182
                                                                                                         
177 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 
 
3, art. 23(1); see supra note 145. 
178 Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1), 99bis.; see supra note 
146. 
179 See Yoridorimidori, 1911 HANREI JIHŌ at 92 [First instance]. 
180 See infra Chapter II.B.1. 
181 See Yoridorimidori, 1911 HANREI JIHŌ at 93-94 [First instance]. The 
characteristic of this theory is that, instead of enlarging the scope of the principal 
committing copyright infringement, it interprets the plain language “those who 
infringe or are likely to infringe” in Article 112(1) of the Japanese Copyright 
Act as the term that has broad meanings, including not only a person who 
directly does the exploitations set forth in Japanese Copyright Act but also a 
person who merely indirectly assists the direct actor. See Tamura, supra note 54, 
at 38-39; see also, FUMIO SAKKA, CHOSAKUKEN HŌ [COPYRIGHT ACT], 803-10 
(3d. ed. 2004).   
182 From the practical point of view, the weakest point of this theory is that 
no courts other than the Osaka District Court adopt it. Tamura, supra note 54, at 
38-39. There are only two such decisions: Yoridorimidori and JASRAC v. Hit-
One K.K., 1842 HANREI JIHŌ 120, 128 (Osaka Dis. Ct., Feb. 13, 2003). 
 
44
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss2/7
2011]    LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS GROUP FEATURE ARTICLE 193 
 
b. The Osaka High Court’s decision  
 
 The Osaka High Court found that Kuromusaizu was the 
principal committing infringement. 183  The court reasoned that 
Kuromusaizu technically decided/controlled each user’s 
reproducing act, which consisted of direct infringement by 
considering that: (1) the unique system of Yoridorimidori allowed 
all residents to take advantage of only one particular TV program 
data; and that (2) Kuromusaizu continuously gave 
maintenance/management by remote control. 184  Also, the court 
held that Kuromusaizu had earned a benefit by this service.185
 
 
F.  Remaining Problems of Japanese Case Laws  
 
The most common characteristic of these Japanese cases is that 
almost all of the court decisions have applied an overall 
consideration standard such as the Karaoke rule or its variation186 
and have considered various factors depending on each 
placeshifting service’s content, leaving large uncertainty for 
deciding the legality of placeshifting technology.187
                                                                                                         
However, in Yoridorimidori, the Osaka High Court as appellate court rejected to 
adopt this theory and applied the variation of the Karaoke rule. Mainichi Hōsō 
K.K. v. Kuromusaizu K.K., 1991 HANREI JIHO 122, 137-38 (Osaka HIGH Ct., 
June 14, 2007). Also, the Tokyo District Court in Miyuki Kitagawa v. Hiroyuki 
Nishimura, 1893 HANREI JIHŌ 131 (Tokyo Dis. Ct., Mar. 11, 2004) explicitly 
rejected this theory. Id. at 134-35. 
 As a result, it 
183 Yoridorimidori, 1991 HANREI JIHŌ at139 [Appellate instance]. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See Sato, supra note 139, at 92. 
187 See Ryūta Hirashima, Chosakuken Shingai Syutai no Hyōka wo 
Meguru Giron ni Tuite – Shiteki Riyou Ryōiki no Kakudai to Sashitome Hani 
Kakutei no Shiten kara- [Discussion Regarding Assessment for Principal of 
Copyright Infringement –From Perspective of Expanding Area of Private 
Exploitation and Determining Scope of Injunctive Relief-], in SAITŌ HIROSHI 
SENSEI GOTAISYOKU KINEN RONSHŪ - GENDAI SYAKAI TO CHOSAKUKEN HŌ 
[THE PRESENT SOCIETY AND COPYRIGHT LAW - ANNIVERSARY COLLECTION OF 
ARTICLES FOR RETIREMENT OF PROFESSOR HIROSHI SAITŌ] 228, 245-46 
(Toyohiro Nomura & Toshiaki Makino ed., 2008); Shiomi, supra note 26, at 
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is impossible to distill a uniform rule as to the legality of 
placeshifting services in Japan. That is the problem that Japanese 
placeshifting businesses are now facing.  
  
1. Inconsistency among the Court Decisions 
 
 In some cases, the conclusions have flipped back and forth 
in the same case. For example, in Rokuraku II, while the district 
court held that the provider was liable for the infringement of 
“reproduction rights,” the IPHC reversed the decision and denied 
liability. The Supreme Court then reversed the IPHC’s decision. In 
addition, in Yoridorimidori, while the district court and the high 
court reached the same conclusion of granting injunctive relief, 
they were completely opposed on the issue of whether or not the 
Karaoke rule should be applied.  
 
2. Difficulty in Finding the Critical Factor 
 
Table 2 at the end of this Article shows the central factors 
considered in each case and the outcome of the decisions. It is 
impossible to provide a consistent explanation for the relationships 
between these factors and the outcomes of each case. 
 
a. Relationship between the number of TV program data 
recorded/transmitted at the service provider’s central place and 
the number of customers who can use that data 
 
The lower court’s decisions in Maneki TV seemed to rely on 
the factor of how many customers can use particular television 
program data recorded and/or transmitted by the placeshifting 
device at the service provider’s central place. 188
                                                                                                         
198.  
 Under this 
consideration, if only one customer can use the particular 
program’s data, that is, if other customers can never use that data, 
188 See Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ 
20081216170214.pdf, at 25-26 [Appellate instance of principal case], 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20061222154234.pdf, at 11[Appellate 
instance of preliminary injunction case]. 
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such placeshifting service should not constitute copyright 
infringement (i.e. a “1-to-1 relationship”). Such services merely 
bundle and support each customer’s legal conduct like a traditional 
timeshifting device, such as a VCR or a DVR. If each customer 
conducts the placeshifting individually, there is no room that such 
conduct would constitute copyright infringement in Japan.189
In contrast, if any customer can use the program data that is 
recorded and/or transmitted by a placeshifting device at the service 
provider’s central place, such a placeshifting service might 
constitute copyright infringement (i.e. a “1-to-many relationship”) 
because it is more akin to the video on demand service, rather than 
merely bundling and supporting an individual customer’s 
placeshifting conduct. 
 There 
should be no reason to regard bundling each legal conduct as 
illegal. 
According to such considerations, it may make sense that the 
courts have concluded that Yoridorimidori, with its 1-to-many 
relationship, should be liable for copyright infringement. 190
 
 
However, because the courts in Rokuga Net and the Supreme Court 
in Maneki TV and Rokuraku II have concluded that service 
providers should be liable despite the services having a 1-to-1 
relationship, these decisions seem inconsistent with that 
consideration. 
b. Access to the service provider’s website 
 
One characteristic of Rokuga Net was that each customer had 
to access FA Vision’s website with a password to request the 
recording and transmitting of television programs. Such a 
characteristic might demonstrate much of the service provider’s 
ability to control/manage the particular exploitation by each user. 
While still unclear, there is a possibility that this factor pushed the 
                                                                                                         
189  The private use limitation might prevent infringement of the 
“reproduction right.” See Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 30 (1). As 
well, the “right of public transmission” and the “right of making a work 
transmittable” might not be infringed because the transmission is not made to 
the public. Id. art. 23(1); see supra notes 145 and 146. 
190 See Tamura, supra note 54, at 65. 
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courts to conclude that FA Vision is liable.191
 
 
c. An original device vs. a commercially available device 
 
Only in Maneki TV, the service provider did not use its original 
device but rather a commercially available device (Sony’s 
“Location Free”). However, the Supreme Court in Maneki TV 
suggested that such a distinction has no meaning in holding the 
service provider liable.  
 
3. Recent Supreme Court’s decision in Maneki TV and Rokuraku 
II 
 
The Supreme Court recently has made disfavor of placeshifting 
clear. Under its standard in Maneki TV and Rokuraku II, almost 
every placeshifting service may be illegal in Japan. However, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions seem to expand the copyright 
protection against placeshifting too broadly and make the boundary 
of copyright law ambiguous. For example, in Maneki TV, the 
Supreme Court seemed to hold that an individual Base Station 
constituted an “interactive transmission server” solely because its 
customer might fall within the definition of public. Under the 
Japanese Copyright Act, “public” refers to unspecific people or a 
large number of specific persons.192 However, because individual 
Base Stations could transmit the data only to an individual 
customer, it might never constitute an “interactive transmission 
server.”193
                                                                                                         
191 See Sato, supra note 
 
139, at 106-07; Tamura, supra note 54, at 62. 
192 The Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 2(5) (providing, “‘the 
public’ includes a large number of specific persons”). 
193 See supra note 146. In this regard, the IPHC correctly understood what 
the matter is. The IPHC analyzed whether the entire system of Maneki TV 
including all the Base Stations at the office constituted an “interactive 
transmission server” and whether an individual Base Station did or did not 
(consequently, holding negative conclusions for both questions). Then, the IPHC 
correctly held that an individual Base Station transmitted the data only to a 
individual customer and the other customers could never access that Base 
Station, and that thus an individual Base Station might not constitute an 
“interactive transmission server.” Maneki TV, 
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Also, in Rokuraku II, the Supreme Court still used the overall 
consideration standard in disfavor for the placeshifting provider by 
reasoning that “reproduction” must be impossible but for the 
provider’s service. However, it is self-evident that the provider 
causes the customer’s reproducing act in a placeshifting service.194 
Thus, the court’s reasoning seems to be insufficient to justify its 
conclusion.195
 
 
V. HOW SHOULD JAPANESE LAW TREAT PLACESHIFTING? 
 
A.  Basic Standpoint  
 
 There is large uncertainty in deciding the legality of 
placeshifting services in Japan because the courts have applied an 
overall consideration standard. Such uncertainty might chill the 
incentive for new placeshifting providers. On the other hand, it is 
not clear how placeshifting services would damage content 
owners’ legitimate interests, which should be protected by 
copyright law. Under such a situation, whether placeshifting is 
illegal should be decided by a legislative body.196 In a civil law 
country such as Japan, it is preferable for the judicial body to be 
discreet in deciding an issue that has not been scrutinized by the 
legislative body. Thus, unless an explicit enactment (including 
revision of the Japanese Copyright Act) is made, the court should 
be reluctant to regard placeshifting as illegal by applying an overall 
consideration standard.197
 
  
                                                                                                         
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf, at 25-27 [Appellate 
instance of principal case]. 
194 If the provider gives no contribution and the customer must act all by 
himself, it is no longer called a service. 
195 Or, we might understand the Supreme Court showed its belief that any 
service of automatically transmitting TV programs must be prohibited with no 
exception. But, such attitude too much favors the protection of contents holders’ 
interest and burdens service providers who try to introduce the novel and useful 
innovation. 
196 See Tamura, supra note 54, at 69. 
197 See id. 
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B.  IPHC’s Decisions Considering the Volition Factor 
 
Two of the IPHC’s decisions, Maneki TV and Rokuraku II, 
denied placeshifting providers’ liability. It should be noted that 
these decisions did not apply the Karaoke rule. They demonstrate 
the IPHC’s attitude of reluctance to apply the Karaoke rule too 
broadly. This author agrees with this IPHC attitude because one 
should not overestimate a copyright holder’s interest by too broad 
an application of the Karaoke rule unless a legislative body has 
first legislated whether placeshifting is illegal or not.  
What theory should Japanese courts rely on to avoid holding a 
placeshifting illegal until the legislative decision is made? This 
Article suggests the volition requirement as one such theory. 
Because, in Japan, an indirect actor’s liability depends on whether 
the actor falls within the scope of the principal committing an 
infringing act under Article 112 (1) of the Japanese Copyright Act, 
the volition factor requiring the principal’s active exploitation of 
specific copyright work might be suitable. Interestingly, as one of 
the reasons for denying the placeshifting providers’ liability for 
copyright infringement, the IPHC’s decisions noted the volition 
element similar to Cablevision: The service provider “not only 
never decided to transmit the digital data . . . but also was never 
involved with such decisions made by each user. . . . Transmitting . 
. . depends on a decision by each user completely”198[in Maneki 
TV] and “[t]he legal reproducing behaviors [was] conducted by the 
users’ free will”199[in Rokuraku II]. Thus, the IPHC has come to 
focus on “the most direct and commonsense assessment to 
understand that each user selects the TV programs which would be 
recorded and transmitted on her own voluntary will and directs the 
recording and the transmission, and then such acts are 
automatically done . . .”200
                                                                                                         
198 Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf, 
at 31-32 [Appellate instance of principal case] (emphasis added). 
 Although these decisions were reversed 
by the Supreme Court, the IPHC’s discreet attitude might be 
preferable until a legislative body decides the legality of 
199 Rokuraku II, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20090224172114.pdf, 
at 31-32 [Appellate instance of principal case] (emphasis added). 
200 Hirashima, supra note 187, at 246 (emphasis added). 
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placeshifting. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Both in the United States and Japan, there remains some 
uncertainty for placeshifting service providers. In the United 
States, although Cablevision provided a clear conclusion that the 
placeshifting provider is not liable for direct infringement with the 
volition requirement, its potential for secondary liability and 
eligibility for the fair use exception still has not passed judicial 
scrutiny. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the volition 
requirement can always work for every placeshifting situation 
including the hypothetical instance that this Article discussed.  
In Japan, the problem is more serious. According to the divided 
court decisions, the legality of placeshifting is uncertain. IPHC’s 
decisions in Maneki TV and Rokuraku II presented a slight hope 
for clarification. The IPHC has become reluctant to regard 
placeshifting as illegal by applying the Karaoke rule and such a 
discreet attitude might be preferable until legislative action occurs. 
However, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions. 
Accordingly, we will have to clarify what kind of placeshifting can 
be legal under the Supreme Court’s decision. This Article suggests 
that the volition factor might be one tool to avoid holding a 
placeshifting service illegal until the legislative decision is made.  
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APPENDIX 
 
FIGURE ONE: CABLEVISION 
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FIGURE TWO: ROKUGA NET 
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FIGURE THREE: MANEKI TV 
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FIGURE FOUR:  ROKURAKU II 
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FIGURE FIVE: YORIDORIMIDORI 
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Case Court/Date Rights at issue Outcome 
Overall 
Consider-
ation 
“Rokuga 
Net” 
Preliminary 
Injunction  
First instance: 
Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 
7, 2004 
Reproduction 
right Infringement 
Applied 
Objection Ct.: 
Tokyo D. Ct., May 
31, 2005 
Applied 
App. Ct.: INTELL. 
HIGH Ct., Nov. 15, 
2005 
Applied 
“Maneki 
TV” 
Preliminary 
Injunction  
First instance: 
Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 
4, 2006 Right of making 
transmittable 
Non 
infringement 
Applied 
App. Ct.: INTELL. 
HIGH Ct., Dec. 22, 
2006 
Applied 
“Maneki 
TV” 
Principal  
First instance: 
Tokyo D. Ct., June 
20, 2008 1. Right of    
 making 
    transmittable 
2. Right of public 
transmission 
Non 
infringement 
Applied 
App. Ct.: INTELL. 
HIGH Ct., Dec. 15, 
2008 
N/A 
Sup. Ct.: Jan. 18, 
2011 Infringement N/A 
“Rokuraku 
II” 
Preliminary 
Injunction  
Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 
30, 2007 
Reproduction 
right Infringement Applied 
“Rokuraku 
II” 
Principal  
First instance: 
Tokyo D. Ct., May 
29, 2008 
Reproduction 
right 
Infringement Applied 
App. Ct.: INTELL. 
HIGH Ct., Jan. 27, 
2009 
Non 
infringement N/A 
Sup. Ct.: Jan. 20, 
2011 Infringement Applied 
 
 
 
 
   
TABLE ONE: CASES IN JAPAN 
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* The Osaka District Court in Yoridorimidori denied establishment of direct 
infringement under “Karaoke” rule. However, it held that the defendant’s 
service should be within the target of injunctive relief. 
 
  
“Yoridorim
idori” 
Principal  
First instance: Osaka 
D. Ct., Oct. 24, 2005 1. Reproduction   
    right 
2. Right of 
    making 
    transmittable 
3. Right of public 
    transmission 
Infringement
* Applied 
App. Ct.: Osaka 
HIGH Ct., June 14, 
2007 
Infringement Applied 
Sup. Ct.: Jan. 20, 
2011 Infringement Applied 
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TABLE TWO: CONTENTS OF SERVICES IN RELATED CASES 
 
Case 
Contents of service 
Outcome 
Device 
Who 
provides 
device? 
Owner of 
device 
Manage-
ment of 
Device 
Right at 
issue 
“Rokuga 
Net” 
 
[1 D / 1C] 
Original 
device 
Service 
provider 
Service 
provider 
(conten-
ded) 
Service 
provider 
Reproduct-
ion right Infringement 
“Maneki 
TV” 
 
[1 D / 1C] 
Commer-
cially 
available 
device 
(Sony’s 
“Location 
Free”) 
Customer Customer Service provider 
1. Right of   
    making  
trans- 
mittable 
2. Right of  
    public 
trans- 
    mission 
 
Lower Ct.: 
Non 
infringement 
Sup.Ct.: 
Infringement 
“Rokur-
aku II” 
 
[1 D / 1C] 
Original 
device 
Service 
provider 
Service 
provider 
Service 
provider 
(contended) 
Reproducti
on right 
Sup.&Dist. 
Ct.: 
Infringement App. Ct.: Non 
infringement 
“Yoridori 
midori” 
 
[1 D / 
many Cs] 
Original 
device 
Service 
provider Customer 
Service 
provider 
1. Reprodu- 
    ction    
    right 
2. Right of  
making   
trans- 
mittable 
3. Right of  
public 
trans- 
    mission 
 
Infringement 
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